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Article

Counting What Matters: Privatization,
People with Disabilities, and the Cost of
Low-Wage Work
Ellen Dannin†
On March 26, 2007, Representative James Sensenbrenner,
Jr., spoke of the need to restore the Americans with Disabilities
Act’s (ADA)1 “‘clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination on the basis of disability’” by
legislatively overruling decisions by the Supreme Court that
have “‘chipped away at some of the ADA’s broad protections.’”2
His thoughts were echoed on August 13, 2007, when Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Chair Naomi
Earp stated that “[f]ederal agencies ‘are not doing well’ in the
area of hiring people with targeted disabilities . . . . ‘The[]
numbers have declined . . . . We have to figure out how to recruit people with disabilities, especially those with mental disabilities.’”3 Earp saw bias as the reason people with disabilities
were not being employed by the federal government.
† Fannie Weiss Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law,
Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A., University
of Michigan; J.D., University of Michigan. This Article is supported by a summer research stipend from Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson
School of Law. I have also been the beneficiary of comments from my Penn
State colleagues through the faculty forum administered by Jeffrey Kahn and
from Robert Baillie, Carrie Griffin Bassas, Katrice Bridges, Richard Lempert,
and Emily Melvin. This Article is a first step in a larger book project. As a result, its focus is on laying the groundwork for a more detailed examination of
all these factors. Copyright © 2008 by Ellen Dannin.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(2000).
2. Press Release, New York Law School, Congressman Sensenbrenner to
Speak on Improving the Americans with Disabilities Act at New York Law
School, March 26, http://www.nyls.edu/pages/5468.asp (last visited Apr. 18,
2008) (quoting Rep. James Sensenbrenner). The speech may be found at http://
www.nyls.edu/pdfs/SensenbrennerSpeech.pdf.
3. Tripp Baltz, Federal Sector ‘Not Doing Well’ in Hiring People with
Disabilities, EEOC Chair Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-7 (Aug.

1348

DANNIN_4fmt

2008]

5/24/2008 11:37 AM

COST OF LOW-WAGE WORK

1349

Representative Sensenbrenner and EEOC Chair Earp are
correct that disability should not be a bar to securing a good
job. They are also correct that the federal government should
be a model employer, continuing its long tradition of employing
capable workers who were discriminated against. However,
discrimination does not fully explain why the government does
not employ more people with disabilities today.
One important factor that has been completely overlooked
is privatization. At least some of those federal jobs have been
lost because the government has contracted the work out to
private companies. That is why no federal employees with disabilities currently work in the mailrooms of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), though before privatization federal employees with disabilities held roughly thirty-five percent of
those jobs.4 In fact, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has targeted for privatization many federal jobs that
were or currently are being performed by people with disabilities because it has defined these jobs as not inherently governmental. Defining a job as commercial—and thus not inherently
governmental—means the work may be contracted out to the
private sector.5
The classification of work as either commercial or inherently governmental seems logical, and the conclusion that only
commercial activities may be contracted out seems reasonable.
The impact on the work performed by people with serious disabilities can be seen only by paying attention to the details
within the very long memoranda that govern federal privatization and that assign jobs to one category or another. An inherently governmental function is a “function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by
Federal Government employees.”6 In a 1992 Policy Letter, the
OMB defined inherently governmental functions as “those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying
14, 2007) (quoting Naomi Earp, Chair, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
4. In re Dep’t of the Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union (Treasury Employees I), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed.
Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470, at 1 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL
1656548.
5. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1, INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS (1992) [hereinafter OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/policy_letters/92-1_092392.html.
6. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270,
§ 5(2), 112 Stat. 2382, 2385 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501(2) (2000)).
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Government authority or the making of value judgments in
making decisions for the Government.”7 Functions defined as
not inherently governmental—and thus candidates for privatization—“include [those] that are primarily ministerial and internal in nature, such as building security; mail operations; operation of cafeterias; housekeeping; facilities operations and
maintenance, warehouse operations, motor vehicle fleet management and operations, or other routine electrical or mechanical services.”8
When the IRS contracted out its mailroom work9 to ServiceSource, a nonprofit organization that “provides job training
and support services to . . . people with disabilities,”10 the OMB
was assisted by two nonprofit organizations, the National Industries for the Severely Handicapped (NISH)11 and National
Industries for the Blind (NIB).12 The OMB was also assisted by
the government agency that works closely with NISH and NIB,
now known as “AbilityOne,” but formerly the Committee for
Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled.13 As
a result, agencies whose stated purpose is to secure work for
people with disabilities actually destroyed jobs held by people
with disabilities.
Even though the privatization of the IRS mailroom work
affected only a few government jobs, it involved people, organizations, and events that provide a useful context for understanding how privatization functions and for identifying the
7. OMB POLICY LETTER NO. 92-1, supra note 5, ¶ 5.
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. See infra Part I.A for a detailed description of this event.
10. ServiceSource Network, Welcome to the ServiceSource Network,
http://www.ourpeoplework.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
11. National Institute for the Severely Handicapped, Home Page, http://
www.nish.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). NISH describes itself as a nonprofit
agency that supports other nonprofit agencies that participate in the AbilityOne Program. Id.
12. National Industries for the Blind, About NIB, http://www.nib.org (follow “About NIB” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). NIB is also a nonprofit
agency operating under the AbilityOne program, and “work[s] to deliver quality products on time at competitive rates.” Id.
13. This agency receives its mandate from the Javits-Wagner-O’Day
(JWOD) Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 46–48c (2000 & Supp. IV 2006). The AbilityOne
(formerly JWOD) Program “provides employment opportunities for nearly
48,000 Americans who are blind or have other severe disabilities by orchestrating government purchases of products and services provided by nonprofit
agencies employing such individuals throughout the country.” JWOD, A Brief
History of the AbilityOne Program, http://www.abilityone.gov/jwod/about_us/
about_us.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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true costs of contracting out federal public-sector work. Privatization proponents justify privatization as providing higher
quality work at lower cost.14 Under the Bush administration,
the OMB has strongly advocated for privatization in reports
projecting cost savings and improvements in service, although
follow-up surveys to verify projected savings are notably absent.15
In its 2002 report, the General Accounting Office, now the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), explained the process
of contracting out federal work as involving cost comparisons to
guarantee that the public would save money and receive higher
quality services. The privatization can proceed either by direct
conversion or cost comparison under Circular A-76.16 Under the
direct conversion approach, commercial activities are transferred from the government to private contractors without a
cost-comparison study. This process typically applies to small
transfers involving ten or fewer civilians. Most job transfers to
the private sector, however, require a cost-comparison study.
Under the cost-comparison approach, unless the privatization
of government work will “save at least $10 million or 10 percent
of the personnel costs of in-house performance (whichever is
less),” the jobs remain in the public sector.17
The process the GAO has laid out sounds reasonable. However, as in the case of the IRS mailroom, the GAO did not always make meaningful cost and quality comparisons. As a result, there has been no guarantee that the public would receive
the promised improvements. In addition, even when there have
been competitions, their narrow focus has included costs that
are trivial when compared to real costs that are excluded and
14. See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Publicization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 117–18 (2005).
15. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: CONDUCTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION IN A REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 2 (2003) [hereinafter OMB,
COMPETITIVE SOURCING], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
procurement/comp_sourcing_072403.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA
17–18 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/
mgmt.pdf. The OMB website refers to the latter as “an aggressive strategy for
improving the management of the Federal government.” Office of Management. & Budget, President’s Management Agenda, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/omb/budintegration/pma_index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
16. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-02-866T, IMPROVING THE SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (2002); infra note 51 and accompanying text.
17. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 2–3.
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thus ignored. Finally, there is no evidence that postprivatization reviews to assess whether cost and quality projections have been met, are performed. Future policy decisions
and decisions to privatize are therefore made based on theory
and not fact.
If we are to properly and fairly assess the cost of federal
privatization, we must first identify and include all of its costs.
We must include all costs related to the privatization process as
well as costs arising from the consequences of privatization. Although this may seem obvious if a fair assessment is to be
achieved, federal agencies have been directed to exclude important costs, while other costs have been effectively excluded
since they are not included in required reporting. For example,
the OMB’s 2006 memorandum sets out costs that agencies are
to report through the Competitive Sourcing Tracking System
(CSTS) for the OMB’s use in its reports to Congress.18
The reports are to exclude costs incurred in fiscal years
other than those in which a privatization competition was completed. Certain identified costs used to prepare for privatization
can be included only if they were “incurred after public announcement of the competition,” such as the “costs of consultants or contractors who participated in the conduct of the
competitions”; “costs of travel, training, or other incremental
expenses directly attributed to the conduct of the reported competitions”; and the cost of work “incurred as part of conducting
the competition (i.e., any staff hired specifically to work on a
particular competition or competitions or fill behind employees
temporarily working on a competition or overtime costs (where
overtime costs are tracked)).”19 Excluded costs included those
incurred before the competition was publicly announced by
regular employees who worked “on the competition during regular working hours,” general competition oversight costs “such
as competitive sourcing office staff or general training provided
to employees that is not considered a part of the competition,”
and the cost of full-time equivalent employees or “contract support associated with specific competitions or out-of-pocket (incremental) costs for conducting individual competitions.”20 Per18. Memorandum from Paul A. Denett, Adm’r, Office of Fed. Procurement
Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, M-07-01, Report to Congress on FY 2006 Competitive Sourcing Efforts (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Denett Memo], available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-01.pdf.
19. Id. Attachment A, at 5–6.
20. Id. Attachment A, at 6, 10.
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haps most troubling was the direction not to include “transition
costs (e.g., Voluntary Early Retirement Authority or Voluntary
Separation Incentive Program costs, moving expenses, etc.).”21
Some of these excluded costs may have been intended for
inclusion elsewhere under the system set out in the memo and
those it incorporates by reference. However, the complex system of segregating costs under the system set out in the OMB
memorandum makes it likely that excluded costs will be missed
entirely. In addition, with the reporting system changing each
year, it is likely that no provisions will be made for fully including all costs. It is also possible that the problems that may lead
to an understatement of obviously relevant costs were intentional. Both the covering memorandum and its Attachment A
make it clear that the OMB wanted to portray privatization as
a success story in its government-wide report to Congress.22
To be fair, reporting on all federal privatization undertakings is a daunting task. The level of information is so great that
difficult decisions have to be made about what to include and
exclude. In addition, while there are similarities among agencies, the nature of their individual missions makes compiling a
uniform report difficult. Furthermore, the agencies and the
OMB have to respond to commands from Congress and the Executive that are influenced by politics and fluctuating public
concerns. The 2006 OMB memorandum bears the hallmarks of
those influences. Furthermore, this process has taken place
within a government that has declining numbers of employees
to manage and then report on the process. In his 2006 study,
The New True Size of Government, Paul C. Light reported that
in 2005 government work was performed by 1,872,000 civil servants, 7,634,000 contract employees, and 2,892,000 employees
on grant jobs.23 In other words, regular employees comprise only about fifteen percent of those performing government work.24
According to Light, this is “the most significant increase in recent history in the largely hidden workforce of contractors and
grantees who work for the federal government.”25
21. Id. Attachment A, at 7.
22. Id. (encouraging each agency “to provide OMB with one or two brief
narrative summaries describing competitions successfully completed in FY
2006 and the practices used to achieve results”).
23. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE NEW TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 11 (2006),
available at http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/files/True_Size.pdf.
24. Id. These figures exclude military personnel (1,436,000 employees)
and postal service jobs (767,000 employees). Id.
25. Id. at 1 (stating that the true size of the federal workforce when con-
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If we are to understand the process and costs of privatization, we need to examine them on a smaller scale. The IRS
mailroom privatization process provides that smaller scale. It
offers an opportunity to identify all sources of costs, including
excluded or overlooked costs, and at last develop the capacity to
assess privatization. The IRS mailroom privatization is ideal
for a number of reasons. First, the IRS privatization involves
many events and issues that are typical of federal privatization, although it also has unique qualities. It most differs in
that not all federal privatization involves a contractor that is a
private nonprofit organization. However, although less dramatically visible than private contractors such as military contractors, nonprofit organizations do actively seek federal work, as
the existence of NISH, NIB, and AbilityOne attest. Thus, although not all cost factors are present in the privatization of
the IRS mailroom, the conditions under which the IRS mailroom was privatized provide a useful means to identify a wide
range of overlooked privatization costs. Second, enough time
has passed since the IRS mailroom privatization was announced and executed that we can identify relevant forces that
affect the process of federal privatization. Third, the small
number of employees and jobs involved makes it easier to track
costs, benefits, impacts, and other consequences of federal privatization.
This Article begins with a discussion of the privatization of
the IRS mailroom and then moves to an examination of the infrastructure that led to its privatization. Next, it explores the
movement of nonprofit organizations into the world of privatization. Finally, this Article examines the nonprofit organization that was given the mailroom work. Within each of these
perspectives, the question is asked: what are the costs and who
bears them?
I. CONTRACTING OUT THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE’S MAILROOMS
A. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO PRIVATIZATION
On April 15, 2003, the IRS announced its plan to transfer
work in IRS mailrooms across the country directly to a private,
tractors and grantees are counted is 14.6 million employees, an increase over
the 12.1 million employees in 2002, and 11 million in 1999). Moreover, in 2005
contract employees accounted for 7.6 million jobs, a 2.5 million increase since
2002 and a 3.2 million increase since 1999. Id.
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nonprofit contractor named ServiceSource.26 This “direct conversion” meant that the mailroom workers were given no opportunity to demonstrate they could do higher quality work at
lower cost than the private contractor.27 Under limited circumstances such direct conversions have been permitted in a range
of federal privatizations, with the right to do so varying from
year to year, depending on changes made to the law and regulations. In fact, whether the IRS had the right to directly convert the mailroom work, rather than engage in a competition to
determine whether private or public workers should perform
the work, was a central issue in the litigation over privatizing
the mailroom work. The IRS argued that a direct conversion
was legal under the law at the time it announced it would contract out the work.28 Ultimately the court decided that the IRS
could not legally privatize individual employees’ work without a
competition, based on the law in effect in fiscal year 2004 when
the jobs were actually contracted out.29
While this decision could have required the IRS to bring
the work back in-house, that did not happen for a number of
reasons that would likely arise in other privatization scenarios.
These appear to be considerations that likely affected the parties’ decisions after the case was issued. First, the district court
decision was issued in 2006, nearly two years after the work
had been transferred to the private sector. As a result, logistical problems arose that would have made it difficult to reestablish the mailrooms and rehire the workers. Many employees
had taken early retirement or other offers and were not available or did not return. Second, the decision was a district court
decision. The parties could have appealed, but decided it was in
their mutual interest to settle the case with small payments to
the few employees who had not taken other offers. Factors that
probably affected the settlement decision include the time and
money already invested, the complexity of the law and facts,
and the need to move on. Third, the IRS could have immediately taken the steps necessary to reprivatize the work, or the
OMB could have issued changes in the regulatory process for
privatizations. Thus, attempting to return the work to the public sector may have been an exercise in futility.
26. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. IRS (Treasury Employees II ), No.
Civ. A. 04-CV-0820, 2006 WL 416161, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (mem.).
27. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 2.
28. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161, at *6.
29. Id. at *7.
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Thus, three years before Representative Sensenbrenner
and EEOC Chair Earp criticized the lack of jobs for people with
disabilities, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)
strongly objected to the IRS mailroom privatization based on its
impact on the current mailroom employees and on job prospects
for people with disabilities. In NTEU President Colleen Kelley’s
words, “‘this type of action is contributing to the decline in disabled federal workers who often have a harder time finding
employment in the private sector. To deny these employees
even the opportunity to compete for their jobs is a travesty.’”30
Despite these objections, over the year and one-half following its April 15, 2003 announcement, the IRS gradually shifted
mailroom work to ServiceSource while eligible mailroom employees retired or took other buyout offers. Meanwhile, the
mailroom employees’ union, NTEU, fought before the Federal
Service Impasses Panel (FSIP)31 and in federal district court32
to keep the jobs. On July 21, 2004, fifteen months after the IRS
announced the privatization, the FSIP ruled that the IRS could
proceed with a “reduction in force” (RIF) of the mailroom employees.33 By that time, twenty-seven of the seventy-eight federal employees who had been working in the mailrooms in October 2003, when the IRS finally signed a contract with
ServiceSource, had left.34 By December 10, 2004, no federal
employees were left to perform IRS mailroom work.35
The IRS has made various claims about the fate of the employees. It is clear that a number lost their jobs as a result of
the RIF notices, including through taking early retirement and
buyout opportunities. The IRS has given varying numbers,
however, so it is not clear how many fell into each category. For
example, the IRS has claimed that either two or as many as

30. Louis C. LaBrecque, NTEU Files Summary Judgment Motion to Stop
IRS Mailroom Job Outsourcing, 42 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2082, at
1053 (Nov. 9, 2004) (relaying NTEU President Kelley’s comments on an EEOC
study finding “a decline of almost 20 percent in the number of federal employees with disabilities”).
31. In re Dep’t of the Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union (Treasury Employees I ), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed.
Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1656548.
32. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161.
33. Treasury Employees I, at 8.
34. LaBrecque, supra note 30.
35. Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161, at *5.
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twelve employees were given positions with the contractor,
ServiceSource.36
B. THE COST TO THE IRS WORKERS OF LOSING THE MAILROOM
WORK
Across the federal government, privatization has moved
jobs from the public sector to the private sector. In the case of
the IRS mailroom, ServiceSource, a nonprofit organization who
focuses on disability issues, acted as the force to transfer jobs
from the public to the private sector. In one sense, contracting
out work in the IRS mailrooms merely replaced federal workers
with disabilities with other people, at least some of whom were
people with disabilities. Although this transfer may seem to be
a wash, it was not.
First, as a philosophical and moral matter, people, even
those who perform low-skilled jobs, are human beings and not
mere fungible items. Second, the federal workers lost jobs that
gave them the dignity and autonomy that work provides. They
had jobs with benefits, civil service protection, and union representation. Identifying what they had and lost as a result of privatization matters both in terms of personal and social costs.
Furthermore, if those who performed the work through the
ServiceSource contract lacked these benefits and protections,
the private job was of lower worth. It is, therefore, important to
identify what these government jobs provided in addition to
pay.37
At best, these mailroom jobs were nothing but low-paid
jobs in either the public or private sector, no matter who held
them. But the process of privatization did more than merely
transfer jobs from the public to the private sector. It transformed low-wage government jobs with benefits, civil service
protections, and union representation into low-wage jobs that
not only lack these protections but are often structured in a
way that takes away the job holder’s ability to be selfsupporting.38 Certainly, the crisis created when the IRS an36. LaBrecque, supra note 30.
37. See E-mail from Rob Shriver, Esq., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union,
to Ellen Dannin, Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., The Dickinson Sch. of Law
(Sept. 28, 2007, 13:11 EST) (on file with author) (stating that most of the affected mailroom employees were grades four and five on the federal pay scale,
and explaining the benefits that such pay grades provide).
38. For example, these jobs were divided among many individuals, and
the work was provided as therapy rather than work. See infra Part IV.B.
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nounced the mailroom privatization demonstrated the value of
union representation for these workers, of having someone willing and able to stand by one’s side in the fight to retain the job.
In other words, the effort to identify the costs of privatization
and to better identify who pays these costs must include the
people who lose these low-wage jobs and the inventory of what
they lose. These personal costs are easy to see once brought to
our attention. However, they are not normally included among
the costs of privatization.
C. THE TAXPAYERS’ COSTS
Ultimately, the taxpayers have borne a large portion of the
costs associated with the immediate contracting process. Our
taxes subsidize displaced workers directly and indirectly while
they remain unemployed.39 In addition to unemployment benefits and programs to help displaced workers find new work, we
must add public money that supports programs, such as those
provided by ServiceSource when people with disabilities or other special needs are involved.
The two lawsuits filed by the NTEU to stop the privatization also generated costs borne by taxpayers. The NTEU is not
unique in taking these actions. Indeed, it is not unusual for unions, and certainly federal employee unions, to fight privatization through litigation, lobbying, and public campaigns.40 In
identifying the costs of privatization, we must, therefore, add
the costs of litigation expenses incurred by the Treasury Department and the NTEU in their battles over the legality of the
decision to privatize these jobs. We, the public, pay for those
courtrooms as buildings and for their physical and human infrastructure. Although most people are probably aware that
these processes and costs exist, people may not be aware that
they might be associated with privatization.
It is even less likely that many people are aware of the
huge governmental and legal apparatus in place to contract out
39. See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE &
STRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 75–78 (1982).

BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDU-

40. Materials, press releases, position papers, and resources to fight privatization may be found at the websites of unions such as the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), see NTEU, Press Room, www.nteu.org/
PressKits (last visited Apr. 18, 2008), the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), see AFSCME, Privatization, http://
www.afscme.org/issues/76.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008), and the American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), see AFGE, Privatization, http://
www.afge.org/Index.cfm?page=Privatization (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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federal jobs to the private sector. This apparatus exists in the
OMB and in every federal agency. In addition, there are government entities, such as FedBizOpps.gov,41 that facilitate such
transfers to the private sector by soliciting bids, a subject we
will be discussing in the next Section.42
Less obvious still is the impact that nonprofit organizations, organizations such as ServiceSource, which is heavily
subsidized by public money,43 have in putting wage pressure on
public- and private-sector jobs. That funding is discussed below,
but it is fair to say that those subsidies are great enough to
mean that, even had the IRS mailroom employees been allowed
to compete with ServiceSource for their jobs, they would likely
have lost. Public subsidies to nonprofit organizations include
outright grants and tax deductions taken by their donors, and
subsidies and grants.
These subsidies affect more than the public sector and public employment. They make it difficult for private-sector competitors to compete with ServiceSource for work. ServiceSource
not only knows that it is able to underbid its private competitors based on price, it explicitly advertises this claim. For example, ServiceSource’s magazine, Our People Work, included
an endorsement from Bruce Wardinski, President and CEO of
Barceló Crestline Corporation: “We bid the contract out against
another commercial company and ServiceSource provided a
more competitive bid. ServiceSource is now doing the document
scanning work for us at a very cost efficient price.”44
While ServiceSource promotes itself as a competitor in the
private sector, it does not advertise that public subsidies help
give it an edge over its competitors. However, this is certainly
the case. For example, since 2001, Fairfax Imaging has donated
its Quick Modules Software to ServiceSource’s Precision Images Document Scanning Division at no cost. ServiceSource
says that this software “has made a drastic change in participants’ work abilities and productivity.”45 Private competitors of
41. Federal Business Opportunities, Home Page, http://www.fedbizopps
.gov/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 46 and 129.
44. ServiceSource Network Document Management Initiative Moves Forward, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, Va.), Spring
2005,
at
13,
available
at
http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/
ServcesourceSpring05.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Precision Images Division and Fairfax Imaging Receive Assistive
Technology Awards from NISH, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network,
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Fairfax Imaging would have to pay for that software. The donation Fairfax makes does not go unrewarded. As a donation to a
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, the Fairfax software entitles it
to a tax deduction for each of those years.46 Thus, ServiceSource’s Precision Images Division receives a public subsidy
that its competitors cannot get and that allows it to offer lower
prices.
When a highly subsidized nonprofit organization like ServiceSource enters the private sector as a competitor, it becomes
a force that can depress private-sector wages. As private-sector
competitors lose bids, they may try to lower pay and benefits,
subject to legal limits. If they are unable to continue in business, their former employees join the ranks of the unemployed,
leading to rising unemployment, which will in turn put more
pressure on wages. Increased unemployment and wage pressure have effects beyond the workplace and the workers who
are immediately affected. Unemployed workers contribute less
to the economy and require public subsidies, such as unemployment payments.47
Taken together, these are but a few of the nontrivial but
invisible costs that, if accounted for, might far outweigh any
savings to the public that even the most optimistic proponent
would claim for privatization. These are public costs of the system that exist even when it is functioning properly without
failures, incompetence, or corruption—problems that continually bedevil privatization.
II. THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT FORCED THE IRS TO
PRIVATIZE ITS MAILROOM
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL PRIVATIZATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
The IRS mailroom privatization needs to be placed in the
larger privatization context, including the infrastructure
created under the George W. Bush administration and Republican Congresses. The processes behind privatization are unfamiliar to most people, and few know more about privatization
Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework
.org/files/ServcesourceSummer06.pdf.
46. See I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2007).
47. For detailed studies of the impact of unemployment, see BLUESTONE
& HARRISON, supra note 39, and DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA (2004).
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than that it is supposed to deliver better performance at lower
cost. Certainly, few know of the role played by the OMB in
overseeing and regulating a process sufficiently powerful to
cause the IRS to enter into a contract to privatize the mailroom48 with such haste that it would take ten more months to
agree to the specific terms of the privatization.
The federal privatization infrastructure is sweeping, huge,
and Byzantine and must have entailed enormous costs to construct, maintain, administer, and upgrade. Its components embody the sort of tedious detail that most of us would rather
avoid. However, it is impossible to understand why the IRS
privatized the mailroom work and did so with such haste without a basic sense of the OMB privatization infrastructure and
the power of these tedious regulations and circulars. Starting
from the OMB’s webpage,49 one can find links to the regulations and circulars that regulate the process of privatization.50
Circular A-76 governs the federal privatization process and is
the most important of these circulars.51 The OMB’s webpage also links to Results.gov,52 whose function is to aggressively promote privatization.
One Results.gov initiative, begun in 2001, is a “management scorecard” that rates individual agencies with green
“stickers” for success, yellow for mixed results, and red for unsatisfactory.53 As Results.gov explains, the system has evolved
since it was developed in 2001; however, the basic structure
remains the same. The scorecard ranks agencies on each of a
number of detailed standards. “Under each of these standards,
48. Solicitation, Offer and Award Between the Internal Revenue Service
and ServiceSource Inc., Contract No. NO-04-D-00005, Solicitation No. TIRNO03-R-00001 (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Solicitation, Offer
and Award].
49. Office of Management & Budget, Welcome to OMB, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/omb (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
50. Office of Management & Budget, OMB Circulars, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
51. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Circular No. A-76 (Revised) (May 29, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf.
52. Results.gov, Home Page, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). The story of the development of the scorecard system
promoting privatization may be found in OMB, COMPETITIVE SOURCING, supra
note 15, at 1.
53. See Executive Branch Management Scorecard: 2001 Baseline Evaluation, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/original_scorecard.pdf (last
visited Apr. 18, 2008); see also OMB, COMPETITIVE SOURCING, supra note 15,
at 7–8 (describing modifications of the scorecard criteria).
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an agency is ‘green’ or ‘yellow’ if it meets all of the standards
for success listed in the respective column, and ‘red’ if it has
any one of a number of serious flaws listed in the ‘red’ column.”54
The current scorecard includes green, yellow, or red rankings for performance on Strategic Management of Human Capital, Competitive Sourcing (i.e., privatization), Improved Financial
Performance,
Expanded
Electronic
Government,
Performance Improvement, Eliminating Improper Payments,
Faith-Based and Community Initiative, Federal Real Property
Asset Management, Improved Credit Program Management,
and Improved Credit Program Management.55 While it might
seem that some of these categories have nothing to do with privatization, some of the historical iterations included privatization within the rubrics under these categories, and there are
other ways in which they are integrated to promote the scorecard goals. For example, the rankings under “Strategic Management of Human Capital” require that those in the Senior
Executive Service, managers, and “more than 70% of the workforce” face personal rewards for achieving agency goals.56 One
of those requirements is “competitive sourcing.” In other words,
privatization of federal work is so important that the OMB
rates the performance of federal agencies and agency executives on privatizing as one stand-alone category and as a part of
another category. The IRS, in conjunction with the President’s
Management Agenda, as part of Department of the Treasury,
was required to meet privatization goals.
Again, most of the public is unaware of this process, but
federal agencies know all too well what they must do. To
achieve a green on Competitive Sourcing (privatizing) an agency must formulate an OMB-approved plan to compete commercial activities; execute a sufficient number of prompt competitions; encourage private- and public-sector participation; and

54. Results.gov, The President’s Management Agenda: The Scorecard,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/scorecard.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2008).
55. Scorecard Standards for Success, http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/
agenda/scorecard.html (follow “scorecard standards for success” hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (setting forth the standards for success under the
President’s Management Agenda).
56. Id.
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regularly track and review its competitions.57 Agencies receive
a red ranking if they fail on one or more of these criteria.58
At first blush, this system seems silly, but it has been quite
effective in motivating agencies to strive for green ratings. For
example, in July 2005, the U.S. Department of Labor bragged,
with no irony, that it was the first federal agency to get greens
in the five then-existing categories and to be the agency in the
forefront of contracting out jobs.59 Labor Secretary Elaine Chao
characterized this as “a tremendous achievement,” and stated
that she has “high expectations that [the Department of Labor]
will continue to meet [the standards].”60
The IRS, along with all other parts of the federal government, felt the same pressures.
B. HOW THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA DROVE THE
IRS TO CONTRACT OUT THE MAILROOM WORK
From December 2002 through December 2003, the Department of the Treasury was in deep trouble. Results.gov gave
it reds on all standards.61 That changed in March 2004 when
the Treasury Department received a yellow for competitive
sourcing, or privatization.62 The General Accounting Office concluded: “The IRS made steady progress on the President’s
Management Agenda this year and we still have room for improvement. The IRS adjusted its ‘Getting to green plans’ to reflect the new ‘Proud to be’ criteria and refined its milestones to
achieve these goals by July 2004.”63 The Treasury Department
was successful because it had appointed a competitive sourcing
director and “[c]ompleted contract negotiations with [the] Na-

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Rel. No. 05-1374-NAT, Labor Department First to Score “All Green” on President’s Management Agenda (July
21,
2005),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/
OPA20051374.htm (“As of June 30, DOL was upgraded to ‘green’ in the fifth
government-wide [President’s Management Agenda] component, Competitive
Sourcing.”).
60. Id.
61. See Results.gov, supra note 54 (follow “THE SCORECARD” hyperlinks
for Dec. 31, 2002, Mar. 31, 2003, June 30, 2003, Sept. 30, 2003, and Dec. 31,
2003) (showing color scores for federal departments in five results categories).
62. Executive Branch Management Scorecard (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/20040514scorecard.pdf.
63. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-126, FINANCIAL AUDIT: IRS’S
FISCAL YEARS 2003 AND 2002 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 82 (2003).
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tional Industries for Severely Handicapped (NISH) for [the]
IRS Mailroom,” for seventy full-time equivalent jobs.64
A private contractor hired by the IRS to give advice on privatizing assisted the IRS in achieving this recognition. In other
words, the President’s Management Agenda created a new
class of private contractors to advise agencies on privatizing.
These contractors must also be paid from an agency’s budget.
One contractor that assisted in the mailroom privatization was
Abacus Technology, which used the mailroom privatization to
publicize its services.65
The Abacus Technology website describes the company’s
recognition for assisting the IRS with the “competitive sourcing
effort,” and describes the 2004 Presidential Quality Award for
Excellence it received.66
This statement, publicizing the awards Abacus and the
IRS received for privatizing the mailroom, reveals a culture
that supports and promotes privatization. It is a culture of
awards, award ceremonies, and photos of presentations in
agency and contractor publications. Participants in the privatization process give awards to one another and then use acknowledgement of these awards to self-promote.
A second entity that supported the mailroom privatization
was NISH, whose role in securing this contract for ServiceSource and relation to JWOD is discussed below.67 A third proponent of privatizing the IRS mailroom was Sharon McPherson, an IRS employee. Abacus, NISH, ServiceSource, JWOD,
and McPherson have been party to many awards as recipients
and awardees for the mailroom privatization. Indeed, the number of awards seems out of proportion with the number of jobs
involved, yet they seem to play a key role in the process.

64. Id. at 83.
65. See Abacus Technology Corporation, Competitive Sourcing and Privatization, http://www.abacustech.com/Solutions/Sourcing/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (“In recognition of our outstanding A-76 consulting partnership with the IRS, we earned the Large Business Partner of the Year
Award. Due in part to our contribution to the IRS in developing the
PWS/QASP for the Area Distribution Center (ADC) competitive sourcing effort, the IRS was awarded the 2004 Presidential Quality Award for Excellence.
Abacus will soon be recognized in a ceremony with the IRS Commissioner.”).
66. See Abacus Technology Awards, http://www.abacustech.com/about_
atc/awards.html (follow “2003 IRS: Nominated for Large Business Partner of
The Year” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 145–50.
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McPherson was honored with the 2006 JWOD Outstanding
Contributions Award for developing and awarding “an unprecedented off-site IRS mailroom contract to a JWOD-affiliated
nonprofit agency—the first nonprofit-owned and nonprofitoperated mailroom operation in the Federal government.”68
ServiceSource gave awards to those who assisted in securing
this work,69 and other nonprofit organizations and federal government agencies reciprocated by giving ServiceSource awards
in turn.70 The ServiceSource magazine and website also spotlight this small contract involving the jobs of fewer than eighty
IRS workers.71 In September 2003, OMB honored the mailroom
privatization as an example “of Commercial Activities included
in Competition Plan.”72
The Results.gov pressure may explain why the IRS was in
such haste to privatize some parts of its work. Indeed, the privatization was so poorly executed that it must have been done
in haste. The IRS announced the decision on April 15, 2003,
even though the terms were not agreed to until October 31,
2003.73 In addition, ServiceSource was incapable of managing
the nationwide system of IRS mailrooms until December 10,
2004,74 twenty months after its relationship with the IRS was
68. JWOD, 2006 JWOD Outstanding Contributions Award Recipients,
http://www.jwod.gov/JWOD/about_us/Halloffame/outstanding_2006.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2008) (recognizing Sharon McPherson, Contracting Officer,
Office of Business Operations, Internal Revenue Service).
69. ServiceSource Recognizes Monumental Achievers and Community
Partners at Annual Meeting, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network,
Alexandria, Va.), Winter 2007, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework
.org/files/SS_winter07.pdf.
70. ServiceSource Selected to Serve as NISH Mail Center Operations Center of Excellence, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria,
Va.), Summer 2006, at 3, available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/
ServiceSourceSummer06.pdf.
71. Central Mail Services Facility Opening, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, Va.), Fall 2004, at 3, available at http://www
.ourpeoplework.org/files/ServcesourceFall04.pdf.
72. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
COMPETITIVE SOURCING: REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION 12 (Supp. 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/
comp_sourc_addendum.pdf [hereinafter OMB, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION].
73. See Solicitation, Offer and Award, supra note 48, at 1 (showing a contract issue date of April 15, 2003 and a signing date of October 31, 2003).
74. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. IRS (Treasury Employees II ),
No. 04-CV-0820, 2006 WL 416161, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (mem.) (“[T]he
last IRS mailroom employees lost their jobs on December 10, 2004.”). At the
time ServiceSource won this contract, it had only operated in the larger District of Columbia metropolitan area, and the ServiceSource network affiliates
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announced. Administration pressures to privatize may also explain why it was worth it to the IRS to refuse to comply with
the law that required it to hold a competition to determine
whether the IRS mailroom employees could do the work better
and at lower cost than the ServiceSource “consumers”75 (the
ServiceSource term for those people with disabilities it provides
with employment).76 As an agency concerned with generating
the country’s revenue, the IRS might have been especially concerned with not wasting money by paying more for services.
However, required competition and decreased costs appear to
have played no part in the decision to privatize. A competition
would have further slowed the privatization process, perhaps
even derailed it if privatization cost more, and meant that the
Treasury Department would have continued to receive a Results.gov rating of all red.
C. THE BATTLE OVER THE DECISION TO CONTRACT OUT THE
MAILROOM WORK
Although failing to comply with the legal requirement to
hold a competition meant that the Treasury Department did
not incur the costs associated with putting work out to bid and
assessing bids, the decision was not cost-free. The IRS faced lit-

operated mainly along the East Coast. See Welcome to the ServiceSource Network, http://www.ourpeoplework.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
Of the employees still working in the IRS mailroom at this time, about
thirty-five percent were people with disabilities. In re Dep’t of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Serv. and Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (Treasury Employees I ), No. 04 FSIP 35 (July 21, 2004), Fed. Serv. Imp. Pan. Rel. No. 470,
at 1 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1656548. When the IRS announced its intention to contract out the work on April 15, 2003, there were
seventy-eight mailroom employees. Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities Responding to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at
6, Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161 (No. 04-CV-0820), 2004 WL
3628200.
75. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Div.
F, tit. VI, § 647(a), 118 Stat. 3, 361; Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161,
at *1, *6–7; see also NTEU Fights Privatization of IRS Mailrooms, FED. DAILY,
Feb. 27, 2006, http://federaldaily.com/federaldaily/archive/2006/02/FD022706
.htm#27c (relaying a federal court’s determination that “the IRS violated the
law by using appropriated funds to privatize IRS mailroom work without allowing IRS employees to compete”). Apparently, ServiceSource uses far more
employees and full-time equivalent jobs to perform this work. See infra text
accompanying note 150.
76. SERVICESOURCE, GUIDE TO REHABILITATION & EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
4
(2007),
http://servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/files/
ServiceSourceRehabGuide07.pdf.
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igation brought by former mailroom employees.77 The mailroom
employees were represented by the NTEU, a union that has
been vigilant in taking action against the privatization of the
jobs of those it represents,78 both in court and in the court of
public opinion. The NTEU’s description of itself emphasizes its
activism as an invitation to workers to join and as a warning to
the agencies that employ its members and potential members.79
The NTEU represents employees in a wide range of agencies and departments.80 All of them live under the threat of privatization. To protect those it represents, the NTEU must—and
does—take an aggressive stand against privatization. In the
case of the IRS, the NTEU has established a website with resources for members to join the fight, including press releases,
information, flyers, and action alerts, as well as offering assistance to taxpayers.81
Thus, the IRS found itself engaged in an expensive lawsuit
to defend its decision to contract out its mailrooms. The IRS
lost the lawsuit but won the war. By the time the court ruled
that the IRS had broken the law, the mailroom workers were so
dispersed and dispirited that reinstatement was not an option.
Rather than battle on through the court of appeals, the union
settled for $4100 to be paid to each of those few employees still
on the payroll (defined as involuntarily separated), and $45,000
to the NTEU Legal Representation Fund for attorney’s fees.82
Most employees received nothing because they took early re-

77. See Treasury Employees II, 2006 WL 416161. The NTEU filed its lawsuit against the IRS on May 20, 2004, asserting that the “agency’s conversion
of the mailroom functions to ServiceSource without a public-private job competition violated the ban on ‘direct conversions’ of federal jobs.” LaBrecque, supra note 30. The case was later settled. Settlement Agreement at 1, Treasury
Employees II, 2006 WL 416161 (No. 04-CV-0820) (on file with author).
78. See The National Treasury Employees Union, NTEU Overview,
http://www.nteu.org/NTEU (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
79. See id. (“NTEU is widely known as a smart, tough organization, wellrespected for its knowledge of federal employee issues. And for its determination to work with federal agencies, with Congress, and in the courts to protect,
promote and expand the rights of those it represents.”).
80. Id. (listing agencies, including the departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Homeland Security, represented by the NTEU).
81. nteuIRSwatch.org, Home Page, http://www.nteuirswatch.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
82. Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, at 3; Stephen Barr, IRS to Pay
Former Workers Whose Jobs Were Outsourced, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2006, at
D4.
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tirement or other options rather than risk losing their jobs and
income.83
D. THE COSTS TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR
EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTING OUT WORK
The events and developments discussed in the prior Sections entail costs. This Section discusses the costs related to the
President’s Management Agenda, the costs of contractor misfeasance and malfeasance, and the costs of errors related to
contracting. Federal employees who retain their jobs by demonstrating that they can do the work for less may win only at
great cost to themselves.
1. The Costs of Complying with the President’s Management
Agenda
As mentioned earlier, privatization is popularly regarded
as a way to lower the cost of government and improve quality
by using the private sector and market competition. However,
privatization processes are not always structured to ensure
that this is the case, and sometimes no effort is made to take
these factors into account. At times private contractors have
been allowed to compete by paying workers less and not offering health insurance. While this may achieve a lower price for
the contract, it may merely shift costs elsewhere, for example,
to welfare, and it does nothing to provide better service. At other times, the government prohibited competition based on lower
pay and benefits.84 In some years, competitions had to take
place after allowing the targeted federal employees to reorganize to achieve maximum efficiency, becoming what is called the
“most efficient organization” or MEO.85 The theory was that the
83. It is impossible to trace these dismissed workers or to identify those
who became charges of the state or federal government, but it is likely this
was the fate of at least some. The Privacy Act bars access to such personal information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
84. A provision signed into law in 2005, for example, is intended to ensure
that, in public-private competitions, the private-sector offeror does not gain an
advantage over the in-house bid by offering inferior health insurance plans or
requiring contract employees to pay a higher percentage for their health insurance than federal employees. Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-287, § 8014(a)(3), 118 Stat. 951, 972; Melanie I. Dooley,
Members of Congress Express Opposition to Health Insurance Comparability
Repeal, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2095, at 155 (Feb. 15, 2005).
85. OMB guidelines require a savings of “at least $10 million or 10 percent of the personnel costs of the in-house performance (whichever is less).”
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 3.
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winner under a MEO would bring an improvement in quality,
as well as in cost. At other times “streamlined” competitions
have been allowed.86 Streamlined competitions allow a competition, but without permitting federal reorganization to achieve
maximum efficiency.
By itself and through constant revamping, the federal Circular A-76 process has created a complex infrastructure, which
has become the foundation for the Federal Activities Inventory
Reform Act (FAIR Act).87 The FAIR Act requires executive
agencies to identify an inventory of work that is not inherently
governmental, and thus subject to privatization.88 The OMB
website provides the most tangible way to grasp what this
process means. The OMB website contains the construction of
Federal Register Notices of the work contractors can bid on and
lists of agency websites “from which interested parties may
access agency inventories.”89
Complying with these complex processes costs money. The
OMB webpage alone represents thousands of hours of work in
the links to competitive sourcing and documentation requirements, circulars related to contracting work out, agency rankings, documents, and guidelines, all of which must be included
in the costs of privatization. This cost is unavoidable if privatization is to take place—there must be some way to administer
the decisions to privatize. Although it is obvious that this infrastructure is a necessary part of the process, these costs are
never included in the cost of privatization. These documents
86. See House, Senate Clear $416 Billion for DOD; Bill Includes Competitive Sourcing Curbs, 42 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2069, at 723, 724
(Aug. 3, 2004); New OFPP Study Shows Smaller Number of Federal Job Competitions in FY 2004, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2094, at 129 (Feb. 8,
2005). Other changes involved cost reimbursements. See Senators Tell OMB
Proposed Changes to FAR Would Favor Contractors over Feds, 42 Gov’t Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2069, at 726 (Aug. 3, 2004).
87. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270,
112 Stat. 2382 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 & Supp. IV
2006)); see New OFPP Study Shows Smaller Number of Federal Job Competitions in FY 2004, supra note 86, at 129. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-04-367, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: GREATER EMPHASIS NEEDED
ON INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2004) (reviewing
agencies’ progress towards establishing competitive sourcing infrastructures).
88. 31 U.S.C. § 501.
89. See Office of Management & Budget, 2005 FAIR Act Inventory Releases,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/fair/fair_releases_
index2005.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008); Office of Management & Budget,
FAIR Notices of Availability, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/
fair/notices_avail.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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and processes are the fruit of the expenditure of taxpayer money, and that expenditure must be included in any calculation of
the costs of privatization.
The opportunity cost to each agency is also ignored. Consider the IRS. It was created to collect the taxes the government needs to operate. Time taken to comply with requirements for competitive sourcing is time lost from the agency’s
mission. Each agency must spend time and money engaging in
the competition and/or MEO process and finding work that
must be offered for competition. The decision to privatize involves, among other steps, case analyses, pre-decisional documents, monthly coordination meetings, and union communication.90
In short, the process of preparing agency “inventory” for
privatization is not trivial, and the costs can be so great that
they affect the operation of core agency functions.
2. The Costs of Contractor Misfeasance and Malfeasance
Privatization does not always operate optimally. At times,
there are serious problems of contractor nonperformance and,
at times, contractor malfeasance. For example, during the long
struggle over privatizing IRS debt collection,91 a pilot experiment led to theft of tax payments by the private debt collectors,
some of whom were eventually convicted. In 2007, Mellon Bank
“agreed to pay an additional $16.5 million to settle claims related to the 2001 destruction of tens of thousands of individual
tax returns and checks that the bank was supposed to process
as an agent for the Treasury Department.”92 This settlement
was in addition to $18 million already paid to reimburse the
federal government for the value of the interest lost on the de90. OMB, PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION, supra note 72, at 3.
91. See IRS Private Debt Collection Program: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 5–25 (2007) (written statement of
Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-utl/ntatestimony_wm_pdc_052307.pdf [hereinafter Olson Statement] (describing many concerns with the efficiency and security of private
debt collection programs); TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO.
2006-10-078, THE REVISED PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION REQUEST FOR QUOTATION ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED PRIOR DEFICIENCIES IN THE SOLICITATION METHODOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/
2006reports/200610078fr.pdf.
92. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Mellon Bank
Agrees to Pay Additional $16.5 Million for the Destruction of Tax Returns and
Checks (June 29, 2007), http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/oi_highlights_2007.shtml
[hereinafter Mellon Bank Agrees to Pay].
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stroyed checks and the costs incurred by the federal government in obtaining replacement checks from the affected taxpayers.93 Mellon also violated the False Claims Act94 and its
employees destroyed more than seventy thousand taxpayer remittances worth more than $ 1.2 billion.95
A more recent pilot program also had problems. In a 2006
report, the National Taxpayer Advocate found that private debt
collectors were not adequately trained to do their work.96 As a
result, it took sixty-five IRS employees to monitor the work of
seventy-five private tax collectors.97 In her written testimony
before the Ways and Means Committee, Nina Olson said private debt collection “may be costing the government more than
it receives.”98 Olson also raised concerns about a wide range of
problems connected with the private debt collectors.99
Perhaps these individuals who broke the law would have
done so regardless of whether privatization existed. However,
we do know that privatization gave the private debt collectors
access and opportunity to take actions that have been costly in
terms of their effect on taxpayers’ lives and time and in prosecution of these crimes.
3. The Costs of Errors in Contracting
Mathematical errors have led to privatization, even when a
private contractor costs more than having public employees
perform the work.100 In one case, the error was the fault of the
private contractor hired to analyze other contractor bids for the
OMB.101 This error was difficult to correct, because at the time
only a wrongly out-bid private contractor was allowed to chal-

93. Id.
94. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
95. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-299, IRS LOCKBOX BANKS:
MORE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT, STRONGER CONTROLS, AND FURTHER STUDY OF
COSTS AND BENEFITS ARE NEEDED 2 (2003).
96. See THE NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at I-2 (2006), available at http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc-exec_summary-2006.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Olson Statement, supra note 91, at 1.
99. Id.
100. See DOD IG Finds $32 Million Error Critical to Source Decision in A76 Competition, 41 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2004, at 370 (Apr. 8,
2003).
101. Id. (describing a mistake made by Mevatec Corp., a consultant company).
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lenge a decision,102 not the federal employees who were to lose
their jobs.103
Work improperly contracted out should, of course, be
brought back in-house. However, the mailroom case shows this
is not necessarily easy to do. As with the IRS mailroom, employees may have retired or taken other jobs or other actions
may have been taken that make it difficult or impossible to
take the work back in-house. As a result, the cost or impossibility of returning the work may mean that it continues to be performed by a contractor at greater cost and lower quality. Furthermore, when experienced employees leave, institutional
memory may be lost, leading to a less efficient operation. Although not part of the normal assessment of privatization, the
loss of jobs, their performance at higher cost and with lower
quality, and the loss of institutional memory leading to greater
inefficiency are costs that need to be taken into account in assessing privatization.
4. The Costs When Federal Employees Win Their Work
In some cases, federal workers have won competitions under the MEO process by reorganizing in order to prove they can
perform the work better and for less. However, they may find
that they have saved their jobs at great cost to themselves. For
example, in August 2005, low-wage IRS workers who handled
and stored tax returns, including files supervisors, lead mail
clerks, mail clerks, and clerks, won a competition over two private bidders.104 Before their MEO, that work was performed by
“843 employees, including 346 permanent employees, 360 seasonal employees, 55 temporary employees, and 82 intermittent
employees at eight service centers.”105 The price of keeping the
work was painful. It required cutting 166 jobs and converting
other jobs from full time to jobs with no fixed work schedule
and no benefits.106 Here, the result of just the process of priva-

102. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 16, at 3 nn.4 & 5.
103. Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-1022T, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE CHALLENGING FOR FEDERAL
AGENCIES 7–8 (2003) (describing federal employee complaints about the lack
of an appeal process).
104. Louis C. LaBrecque, IRS Workers Win Battle over Outsourcing of Tax
Return Handlings; 166 Jobs Still Cut, 43 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No.
2121, at 824 (Aug. 23, 2005).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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tization has led to more low-paid employees who lack health
benefits and may thus need public support.
In other words, the system that compels federal agencies to
privatize—and that led to the loss of the IRS mailroom jobs—is
a system that has the power to turn decent jobs into bad jobs,
with low pay, job insecurity, and no benefits. It is also one that
imposes large costs on the public in the process.
III. THE INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SUPPORTS THE
MOVEMENT OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS INTO THE
WORLD OF PRIVATIZATION
A. THE NONPROFIT PRIVATIZATION INDUSTRY AND THE POVERTY
JOBS IT CREATES
So far we have examined the privatization of one federal
agency’s mailroom work as a way to identify and account for
the costs of the federal privatization process. The IRS mailroom
also provides a window into the growing presence and impact of
nonprofit agencies as contractors. Privatizing the IRS mailroom
contributed to the revenue of ServiceSource, the contractor who
was given the mailroom contract. In fiscal year 2006, ServiceSource had nearly $70 million in revenues.107 As ServiceSource
and other nonprofit organizations enter the world of privatization, their operations must be included among the full costs of
privatization.
ServiceSource may be a nonprofit agency, but with annual
revenues of $69.5 million108 it is hardly a shoe-string operation.
Its federal contract work extends far beyond IRS mailrooms. As
of 2006, ServiceSource had contracts to perform mailroom, food
service, and warehouse work for many different federal agencies.109 All or most of this work is certain to be low-wage at
107. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006), available
at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/Network_ar06.pdf.
108. Id.
109. As of 2006, ServiceSource had mailroom contracts with, among others,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Commerce and
Transportation, the National Archives I & II, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, the United States Mint, the Internal Revenue Service, Fort
Bragg, and the National Science Foundation. See ServiceSource Network, Publications, http://www.ourpeoplework.org/content.asp?contentid=357 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (follow “Annual Reports” and “Newsletters” hyperlinks).
As of 2006, ServiceSource also provided food service for, among others, the
Marine Corps, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Fort Bragg, the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), General Services Administration (GSA), the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Pope Air Force Base,
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best. Moreover, providing low-wage work at privatized job sites
is a growth industry for ServiceSource. Revenue for fiscal year
2006 was up 13.5% from fiscal year 2005.110 In 2006, ServiceSource employed 188 workers, or 17% of its workforce, in mail
service,111 and operated in nine states and the District of Columbia.112 This growth in revenues enabled ServiceSource
Network to hire a large executive staff, which, in turn, likely
helps ServiceSource further increase revenues.
B. THE MANY PIECES OF SERVICESOURCE
The ServiceSource Network is formally composed of four
affiliates: the Opportunity Center, Inc., ServiceSource, EmploymentSource, and Abilities of Florida.113 ServiceSource is a
nonprofit organization located in Alexandria, Virginia.114 These
organizations’ formal and informal affiliations and cooperative
relationships include overlapping officers and employees, with
as many as six organizations contributing to an individual’s
pay. The Network appears to be bound together by its stated
purposes of providing work, training, and support services to
people with disabilities.115
However, ServiceSource has a network of related organizations that extends far beyond its formal affiliates. The number
of organizations, the purpose of their relationships, and the
way money moves among them is puzzling. That complexity
makes it difficult for outsiders to know who the organization is,
but it also seems to place an extra burden on ServiceSource.
For example, each of these organizations must file a separate
income tax form, and the complexity seems to have caused its
tax preparer at least minor problems in knowing exactly how
much its officers are paid. Each form includes tables with pay
for other organizations, but some of these figures vary slightly.

the VA Medical Center, and the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA). See id.
ServiceSource also performed warehouse work at the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation. See id.
110. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 9.
111. Id. at 2.
112. ServiceSource Network Achieves Unprecedented Year in FY 06, OUR
PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 3,
available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/Servcesource/Summer06.pdf.
113. ServiceSource Network, About Us, http://www.ourpeoplework.org/
content.asp?contentid=354 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
114. Id.
115. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 2.
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It is unclear how this complexity promotes ServiceSource’s
stated mission and whether the costs of complexity outweigh
the benefits to those ServiceSource is supposed to serve. The
law gives nonprofit organizations certain benefits in exchange
for strict limitations on their purposes and behavior that would
not apply to a private company.116 Although there is no evidence of any illegality on the part of ServiceSource, such a
complex organizational and pay structure could facilitate the
evasion of laws that limit certain behavior by nonprofit organizations, such as prohibitions on lobbying.117 In exchange for being tax-free, the tax forms of nonprofit organizations are public,
and they must reveal meaningful information that can be used
to determine whether they are in compliance with the law. A
complex organizational structure, for example, would permit
one component to state on its Form 990118 that it engaged in no
lobbying while gaining lobbying services through a sister organization.
ServiceSource’s operations appear to straddle both the
nonprofit world and the world of small business. Its subsidiary
division, Precision Images, provides various copying and other
document services and employs fifteen people with disabilities.119 Its operating costs are lowered in several ways. First,
section 214(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act permits paying a
sub-minimum wage to “individuals . . . whose earning or productive capacity is impaired by . . . physical or mental deficien116. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000) (exempting organizations described in
I.R.C. § 501(c) from taxation); id. § 501(c) (limiting tax-exempt status to notfor-profit entities organized and operated “exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals”).
117. See id. § 501(c) (prohibiting tax-exempt organizations from lobbying or
participating in political campaigns for public offices).
118. See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, Pt. IV (asking whether the organization engaged in political lobbying during the previous year). Tax-exempt organizations use Form 990 to provide the
IRS with information necessary to maintain their tax-exempt status. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 1
(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990-ez.pdf (discussing the
purpose of the form).
119. Press Release, ServiceSource, ServiceSource, Inc. Precision Images
Division and Fairfax Imaging Selected to Receive Assistive Technology Award
at 2006 NISH National Conference (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/files/PrecisionImages.pdf; see also
Meeting Minutes, Mid-Atlantic District, The Association for Work Process Improvement (Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://www.tawpi.org/documents/
MidAtlanticChapterMtg10-26-06.pdf.
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cy.”120 Second, the tax code promotes donations of goods to nonprofit organizations by giving the donor a tax deduction. Since
2001, ServiceSource’s Precision Images has benefited from
Fairfax Imaging’s donations of its Quick Modules Software.121
It also benefits from the array of support services ServiceSource can offer. Indeed, a job at Precision Images is more than
just a job—it is training. That training may be provided
through donations and grants. While this training can be useful, mixing private-sector activities with training, transportation, and other services to people with disabilities may cause
confusion of missions, and undermine market competition.
The operation of the ServiceSource network and its allied
organizations may reflect the way nonprofit organizations are
run and have little to do with contracting out as an important
source of money and support. At least some of the complexity
may be inherent in providing the range of services the ServiceSource Network offers to the disabled. It could be a product of a
system that operates inefficiently. Perhaps the complexity of
the ServiceSource system and its finances is related to its need
to fundraise, win grants and government contracts, and persuade governments to facilitate such funding through legislation. Finally, some complexity may be related to and a consequence of ServiceSource’s move into the business of
privatization.
While ServiceSource publicizes many of its affiliates, subsidiaries, and related organizations, locating other related organizations and understanding their relationships requires
more research. Subsidiaries and closely related organizations
include organizations located at the same address as ServiceSource Network and ServiceSource and in some cases, at the
same telephone number. These include ServiceSource Foundation, the organizations’ fundraising arm;122 EmploymentSource,
120. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2000).
121. Precision Images Division and Fairfax Imaging Receive Assistive
Technology Awards from NISH, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network,
Alexandria, Va.), Summer 2006, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework
.org/files/ServcesourceSummer06.pdf.
122. ServiceSource
Network,
ServiceSource
Foundation,
http://
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=372 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). Although not discussed in this Article, fundraising and
support for fundraising through devices such as awards and awards banquets
is a major focus of the ServiceSource affiliates. These activities provide publicity designed to appeal to donors and other supporters. The IRS mailroom privatization was highly publicized—indeed, to a degree that seems to far exceed
the number of jobs created.
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which provides employment services and outsourcing options to
private and government agencies in North and South Carolina;123 the Opportunity Center, Inc. (OCI), which provides services in Delaware; Community Thrift, Inc.;124 the Laurie Mitchell Employment Center, Inc.;125 and VaACCSES (the Virginia
Association of Community Rehabilitation Programs), a lobbying
and educational organization.126 Another formal SSN subsidiary, Abilities, Inc. of Florida, also lists many subsidiary corporations on its IRS 990.127 These subsidiary corporations are
funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
to help individuals with disabilities find rental properties.128
Most of ServiceSource’s $70 million in revenues is generated from public sources. Table 1, infra, shows that organizations
related to ServiceSource derived between 98.17% and 100% of
their support for 2005 from public sources.

123. ServiceSource Network, Welcome to EmploymentSource, http://
servicesrcsub2.timberlakepublishing.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
124. Community Thrift, Inc. operates thrift stores that provide work opportunities in Manassas, Virginia and Fayetteville, North Carolina. EmploymentSource, Community Thrift of Fayetteville, http://servicesrcsub2
.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=368 (last visited Apr. 18,
2008); ServiceSource Network, Community Thrift of Manassas, http://
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=373 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
125. The Laurie Mitchell Employment Center website lists the ServiceSource main address under its contact information. Compare Laurie Mitchell
Employment Center, A Brief Intro, http://www.lmec.org/Home.asp (last visited
Apr. 18, 2008) (listing its address as 6295 Edsall Road, Suite 175, Alexandria,
Virginia 22312), with ServiceSource Network, Contact Us, http://
servicesrcsub1.timberlakepublishing.com/content.asp?contentid=389 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (listing its address as 6295 Edsall Road, Suite 175, Alexandria, Virginia 22312).
126. See VaACCSES, Vision Statement/Mission Statement, http://www
.vaaccses.org/html/about.htm (follow “Vision Statement/Mission Statement”
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (describing its activities as “develop[ing]
effective relationships and influenc[ing] policy makers, funders and advocates
through information, advocacy, education and training”); see also VaACCSES,
Statement of Program Service Accomplishments (I.R.S. Form 990, Pt. III)
(2005) (listing its primary exempt purpose as “educational”). VaACCSES
claimed on its 2005 IRS filing that it spent $10,207 on lobbying. VaACCSES,
Statements About Activities (I.R.S. Form 990, Schedule A, pt. III, l. 1) (2005).
127. These subsidiaries include a number of separately incorporated organizations, including Homes for Independence, Inc. See Abilities, Inc. of Florida,
Additional Information, pt. IV, l. 80 (I.R.S. Form 990, Statement 1) (2005).
128. Id.
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Table 1. Public Support of ServiceSource-Related Organizations129
Organization

Percentage of Revenues from
Public Support

Opportunity Center, Inc.
Abilities, Inc. of Florida

99.6989%
n/a

ServiceSource Employment Services, Inc.

99.973%

EmploymentSource

99.8935%

Homes for Independence, Inc.
ServiceSource
ServiceSource Foundation
Abilities Rehabilitation Center Foundation
Community Thrift, Inc.
Yesterday’s Rose
VaACCSES

n/a
98.1737%
100%
n/a
99.999%
n/a
99.71%

The organizational complexity is recapitulated in the pay
structure for ServiceSource Network officers and key employees. The data in Table 2, infra, show that pay for virtually
all these high-level employees came from multiple sources. Half
of these employees received pay from six sources. This complexity obviously pays off for the officers and key employees of ServiceSource, but it makes tracking the level and source of pay
difficult.
Some may wonder whether the level of pay to the individuals and in total is appropriate. This answer is complicated by
issues related to geographic location, size, and the business of
the organization. What can be said, however, is that the highest pay (which includes pay, benefits, and expense accounts)
was $263,474 for the CEO, paid through six organizations. For
fiscal year 2005, eight of the sixteen individuals listed in Table
2 received over $150,000.

129. The data in Table 1 are derived from each organization’s I.R.S. Form
990 for 2005.
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Table 2. Pay Structure for ServiceSource Network Officers and
Key Employees130
Officers and

FY 2005 pay in-

Total

ServiceSource Affiliates

Key Employees

cluding benefits

Weekly

Paid By

and expense ac-

Hours

counts
Janet Samuelson

$263,474

42

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,

Mark Hall

$206,552

40

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,

David Hodge

$202,541

37

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,

Bruce Patterson

$186,765

40

SS, OCI

Bertha Ngenge

$167,575

41

SS, ES, OCI, Abili-

William Sandonato

$205,415

40+

SS, ES, OCI, Abili-

SSES
SSES
SSES

ties, Homes, SSES
ties, Homes, SSES
Jeff Ring

$114,648

35

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,
SSES

Lisa Ward

$114,895

48

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,

Thomas Chang

$156,819

42

SS, ES, OCI, Abilities, Homes,

Catherine Lloyd

$121,525

40

OCI

Guy Klenke

$179,353

40

SS, ES, Abilities, Homes,

SSES
SSES

SSES
Alan Desrosier

$85,529

40

SSES

Larry Crabtree

$144,985

40

SS

Thomas Troeschel

$143,581

40

SS

James Aynes

$90,332

40

ES

Lori Kreisle

$68,680

unknown

Homes

SS=ServiceSource; ES=EmploymentSource; OCI=Opportunity Center, Inc.; Abilities=Abilities
Inc. of Florida; Homes=Homes for Independence, Inc.; SSES=ServiceSource Employment Services, Inc.

130. The figures are taken from the organizations’ 2005 I.R.S. Form 990 for
key officers. The Form 990 information does not necessarily disclose all remuneration for these individuals.
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In addition to the officers listed on this table, a number of
executive individuals also receive pay through the same organizations listed in Table 2. For example, lobbyist Karen Tefelski
was paid $94,178 in 2005 as an associate director of ServiceSource,131 as well as $83,475 as executive director of
VaACCSES,132 for a total of $177,653.133
The IRS 990 and other publicly available documents do not
explain why ServiceSource uses this complex structure nor
whether it is a reasonable way to operate. Only research based
on the more detailed accounts of each organization and other
internal documents can determine whether this form of operation is an appropriate use of what in large part is funding derived from public sources.
C. THE PRICE OF PRIVATIZATION AND LOW-WAGE WORK
While the officers and key employees do not receive outrageously high pay by today’s private-sector standards, they do
receive far greater compensation than many of those who work
for the ServiceSource Network-related organizations. Those
employees with disabilities, in particular, are certainly among
the low paid.
Table 3, infra, compares employee and officer pay. The column “Average Pay per Employee” assumes that Officer Pay is
not included in Total Employee Pay. If that assumption is in131. See ServiceSource, Inc., Compensation of the Five Highest Paid Employees Other Than Officers, Directors, and Trustees (I.R.S. Form 990, Schedule A, pt. I) (2006) (listing Karen Tefelski as Association Director, compensated at $94,178).
132. See VaACCSES, List of Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key
Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, pt. V-A) (2006) (listing Karen Tefelski as Executive Director, compensated at $83,475).
133. Tefelski is also listed as a registered lobbyist on behalf of VaACCSES.
See Virginia Association of Community Rehabilitation Programs, Donors: Details of Lobbying Relationship, http://vpap.org/donors/lobby_details.cfm?key=
ORP000210590&inkey=INP000302912 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). The relationship between ServiceSource and VaACCSES apparently predated Tefelski’s hire. On its 2005 Form 990, VaACCSES lists the Executive Director as
simply “Service Source,” compensated at $93,229. ServiceSource, Inc., List of
Current Officers, Directors, Trustees, and Key Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, pt.
V) (2005). When asked whether any “officers, directors, trustees or key employees . . . or highest compensated employees . . . or highest compensated professional and other independent contractors . . . receive compensation from
any other organizations, whether tax exempt or taxable, that are related to
this organization through common supervision or common control,” however,
VaACCSES answered “no.” VaACCSES, Current Officers, Directors, Trustees
and Key Employees (I.R.S. Form 990, Part V-A, Line 75(c)) (2006).
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correct, then average pay would be lower. For example, in the
case of OCI, average pay would drop by about $2000 to $9795.
Another way to assess pay levels is to consider total officer pay
compared to the total employee pay. In some cases, officer pay
exceeds total employee pay (Abilities Rehabilitation Center
Foundation), while in others there is either no officer pay
(Community Thrift and Yesterday’s Rose) or it comprises only
five percent of total employee pay (ServiceSource).
Table 3. Comparison of Employee and Officer Pay134
Employer

Total Employees

Total Employee

Average Pay

Total Officer

Pay

per Employee

Pay

OCI

165

$1,958,012

$11,866.73

$341,786

Abilities

150

$3,720,288

$24,801.92

$303,335

SSES

219

$3,577,694

$16,336.50

$197,309

Employment
Source

278

$3,087,293

$11,105.37

$278,249

5

$53,387

$10,677.40

$99,396

ServiceSource

999

$19,730,930

$19,750.68

$1,053,676

SS Foundation

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

Abilities
Rehabilitation
Center
Foundation

3

$58,845

$19,615.00

$124,235

Community
Thrift

10

$158,076

$15,807.60

0.00

Yesterday’s
Rose

12

$163,042

$13,586.83

0.00

Homes

The average pay per employee does not reveal the range of
pay nor what jobs the pay is for. In order for ServiceSource to
provide services for its constituents, it must employ people with
a wide range of skills. To attract those skilled workers it will
134. As with the officer pay, the information on pay and number of employees in Table 3 is derived from information reported on the organizations’
tax returns for 2005, the most recent forms available.
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have to pay more than the average pay displayed in Table 3.
Recent job postings for the DC Metro Region illustrate the
range of jobs ServiceSource hires for: Resource Room Instructor, Assistant Manager I & II, Facilities Engineer, Employment
Development Specialist, Compensation & Benefits Manager, IT
Network Administrator, Community Integration Specialist I,
Community Rehabilitation Specialist I, and Van Drivers.135
In the same announcement were job listings for “Set-Aside
Positions,” or positions open only to individuals with a documented disability.136 Those positions include Dining Facility
Attendants and Mess Attendants at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.137 The mess attendant salary is posted as
“[a]round $9.01 per hour.”138 For a full-time job, that would be
an annual salary of about $18,000. However, as the next Section shows, in the case of the IRS mailroom work, many of the
workers did not have full-time jobs.
In short, working for ServiceSource can pay, but of ServiceSource’s $70 million in revenues, almost all paid for by the
taxpayers, very little seems to provide self-supporting, wellpaying jobs for those ServiceSource exists to serve. If that is
correct, it is a high price to pay for low-wage work. This is, of
course, a preliminary judgment made on the basis only of publicly available documents. An examination of other materials
might lead to a different conclusion. However, if it is correct
that this money creates low-wage work of such poor quality
that those employed cannot be self-supporting, then we need to
ask whether this is this the best way to promote the interests of
people with disabilities. Moreover, if these funds are used to
destroy and degrade existing jobs that did allow the workers to
be self-supporting, then this does not seem to be an appropriate
course of action or use of public money.
IV. THE NONPROFIT CONTRACTOR THAT WAS GIVEN
THE IRS MAILROOM WORK
A network of nonprofit organizations that provides services
to people with disabilities, with $70 million in annual revenues,
should be counted as a success. However, the elements of Ser-

135. ServiceSource Network, DC Metro Region, http://www.ourpeoplework
.org/content.asp?contentid=383 (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
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viceSource’s success are not simply hard work and quality of
service. In addition, its achievements include costs.
A. AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS
ServiceSource describes itself as a small nonprofit organization that employs about one thousand people with disabilities
and specializes in “government contracts to operate mail centers, provide food services to our Nation’s military and administrative services.”139 Of those one thousand people, ServiceSource employs “approximately 100 people with disabilities . . .
[to work] at more than 30 IRS mailrooms across the country.”140
ServiceSource has certainly been successful in getting contracts
to perform this work. Champions of privatization, however,
usually promise higher quality work at lower cost. If a contractor does not meet both of these criteria, then the public is
spending more money than it should. How successful has ServiceSource been in meeting these criteria? ServiceSource
needed eighteen months to reach the point where it could manage work done by fewer than eighty IRS employees. This time
lag suggests that no money was saved during that period. Despite this, ServiceSource continued to successfully acquire contracts to operate other federal mailrooms.
In June 2007, ServiceSource attributed its success not to
its own merits, but rather to the support provided by the
JWOD program. “Since 1981, the AbilityOne [JWOD] program
has played a vital role in providing ServiceSource Network employees with challenging and rewarding employment opportunities.”141 In 2006, ServiceSource said that it was thanks to
JWOD that it operated seventy mail centers for sixteen federal
agencies and employed “over 175 people with disabilities who

139. ServiceSource Recognizes Monumental Achievers and Community
Partners at Annual Meeting, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network,
Alexandria, Va.), Winter 2007, at 8, available at http://www.ourpeoplework
.org/files/ss_winter07.pdf.
140. Id. As of fiscal year 2006, ServiceSource Network employed eightyeight workers in mail service, that is, seventeen percent of its total workers
with disabilities. SERVICESOURCE NETWORK, supra note 107, at 2.
141. Press Release, ServiceSource Network, ServiceSource Network Employees Visit Capitol Hill (June 11, 2007), available at http://servicesrcsub1
.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NISH_Grassroots07.pdf. As of 2006, ServiceSource workers were employed in government mailrooms at the Environmental Protection Agency’s Research and Distribution Departments and at its Data Acquisition and Handling System (DAHS Mail Center), and the
Department of Transportation. SERVICESOURCE, supra note 76, at 15.
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process over 75 million pieces of mail per year for the federal
government.”142
As discussed earlier, the JWOD program, now referred to
as AbilityOne, is a part of the government, created under the
Javits-Wagner-O’Day (JWOD) Act.143 Its purpose is to “generate employment and training opportunities for people who are
blind or have other severe disabilities . . . [by providing] a major and stable source of employment-generating contracts for
over 600 nonprofit agencies.”144 Two nonprofit organizations,
NIB and NISH, work with JWOD to distribute “government orders among nonprofit agencies employing persons who are
blind or have other severe disabilities . . . , by working closely
with government contracting specialists and local nonprofit
agencies to match government requirements with the capabilities of the agencies.”145 NIB and NISH are independent private
organizations, not federal entities, but they play a major role in
awarding federal contracts. Each of the 626 community rehabilitation programs that participated in the JWOD Program at
the end of fiscal year 1997 is affiliated with either NIB or
NISH.146
Without NISH, NIB, and the JWOD program, a small nonprofit organization operating mainly in the Virginia area and
only on the East Coast probably could not have secured a nationwide federal contract to operate something as sensitive and
critical to the national interest as the IRS mailrooms. In addition, winning this work required support in order to find subcontractors outside the Washington, D.C. area.147 According to
a NISH report on its operations in fiscal year 2004, ServiceSource directly managed only one IRS Mail Facility—a facility
near ServiceSource’s headquarters in Virginia.148 ServiceSource
142. ServiceSource Selected to Serve as NISH Mail Center Operations Center of Excellence, OUR PEOPLE WORK (ServiceSource Network, Alexandria,
Va.), Summer 2006, at 15, available at http://www.ourpeoplework.org/files/
ServiceSourceSummer06.pdf.
143. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
144. Beverly Milkman, The Javits-Wagner-O’Day Program, AM. REHABILITATION, Spring 1998, at 10, 10.
145. Id. at 11–12.
146. Id. at 13.
147. NATIONAL INDUSTRIES FOR THE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED [NISH], 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 2–3, 19 (2004), available at http://www.nish.org/NISH/Doc/0/
TP23HRVQGP6KJEG2QO4QGRIC71/AR_FINAL.pdf (describing NISH’s role
in securing IRS mailroom contracts for NISH- and NIB-associated nonprofit
agencies).
148. Id. at 19.
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subcontracted management of the rest of the IRS’s thirty-three
mailrooms to twenty-eight other nonprofit organizations spread
across twenty-four states.149 These mailroom subcontracts provided ninety-one full-time equivalent jobs for people who were
blind or had other severe disabilities. NISH also reported that
at the end of the 2004 fiscal year, only thirteen of the thirtythree IRS mailrooms were “operational.”150
In other words, identifying the costs of contracting out federal work to nonprofit agencies affiliated with NISH or NIB
means including the costs of the JWOD program and the public
support provided to NISH and NIB.
B. THE COSTS OF UNQUALIFIED PRIVATIZATION SUCCESS
The 2004 NISH report implies that the work seventy-eight
IRS mailroom employees working in sites across the country
had performed before privatization, became ninety-one fulltime equivalent jobs following privatization. ServiceSource apparently completed the labor of these ninety-one full-time
equivalent jobs using about 197 employees with disabilities, in
addition to other workers. At this time, ServiceSource was operating only one mailroom and ServiceSource and its subcontractors were only operating thirteen of the twenty-eight IRS
mailrooms.151 This increase in full-time equivalents and workers employed suggests that the real cost per job to have mailroom work performed by contractors is greater following mailroom privatization. In addition, using 197 people to perform
ninety-one full-time equivalent jobs meant that the average
worker was working about eighteen hours a week and thus unlikely to be able to be self-supporting.
The costs of subcontracting must also include higher costs
of supervision. First, there are more employees to supervise.
Second, some ServiceSource workers who perform mailroom
work come from its “Group Supported Employment” program
which has a supervisor to “consumer” ratio of five to eight.152 In
addition, ServiceSource provided transportation to work sites,
as well as counseling, program planning, community integration, and training in using public transportation.153 and seems
likely to have provided at least some of these services to a far
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3, 19.
SERVICESOURCE, supra note 76, at 12.
Id.
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greater number of workers needed to perform the mailroom
jobs. All this information concerning staffing and including the
high level of public revenue ServiceSource and its related organizations received are costs that can be translated into taxpayer dollars that ServiceSource has received as grants and
other forms of government subsidies.
To the costs identified so far, we must also add the impact
of inefficient workflow created by serial outsourcing, the complexity of this new organizational structure, and the problem of
ensuring security. It is easy to dismiss the almost invisible
work done in an organization’s mailroom as low level and unskilled. However, even in the day of electronic communication,
mailroom efficiency is critical to the mission of the agency. In
the case of the IRS, it is likely to involve the receipt of sensitive
taxpayer documents and information which must be kept secure.
Inefficient workflow problems appear to have plagued the
post-privatization IRS mailroom. In 2006, NTEU President Colleen Kelly testified that “employees have witnessed abysmal
mail service by the contractor. Mail has been misdirected to incorrect PODs, mail is not delivered in a timely fashion, and IRS
employees are expected to do the work for which the vendor has
a contractual obligation.”154 Kelly contended that these failures
deserved investigation and action: “This is certainly an area
where the IRS should further explore the true cost to the U.S.
taxpayer in using an outside contractor and consider returning
the mailroom work to IRS employees.”155
Inefficiency is not unusual when work is contracted out.
The sorts of problems encountered during the privatization of
the IRS mailrooms and their attendant costs are the same sorts
of problems that regularly arise from contracting out work.156 A
Deloitte Consulting study implies that contracting out the
mailroom work places an obligation on the IRS to perform over154. IRS Oversight Board Public Forum 6 (Feb. 8, 2006) (testimony of Colleen M. Kelley, President, National Treasury Employees Union), available at
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/meetings/2-08-06/statement-NTEU.pdf .
155. Id.
156. See DELOITTE CONSULTING, CALLING A CHANGE IN THE OUTSOURCING
MARKET 2 (2005), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_
outsourcing_callingachange.pdf (“The world’s largest companies have engaged
in outsourcing for a variety of reasons . . . . However, contrary to the optimistic
portrayal of outsourcing by vendors and the marketplace, outsourcing is an
extraordinarily complex process and the anticipated benefits often fail to materialize.”).
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sight to ensure the contractors have not been shirking their duties. That oversight must be nationwide, and it must now penetrate through multiple levels of contracting. That oversight,
too, must be included in an accounting of costs.
CONCLUSION
The Government Accountability Office recently released
two reports that found contractors for the Department of Homeland Security were performing work that, by law, is inherently governmental and only to be performed by federal employees.157 The increasing use of privatization—a process that
was supposed to be concerned with more mundane issues such
as improving performance and lowering costs—means that this
country is engaged in a shift of government and governance.
This transformation has gone on with little public notice paid to
it and with no public demand that claims for improved service
and cost savings be verified. The time is long past for engaging
in a full and fair accounting of the costs involved in privatization. This Article is a first step in identifying many of the
costs that are likely to be incurred in connection with federal
privatization and to a greater or lesser extent with privatization at the state or local levels. Those previously ignored costs
include the expense of a complex system set up to promote the
process of privatization and the costs of responding to the consequences of privatization, among many others. For years we
have made no effort to find the answer to whether privatization
results in savings or whether privatization costs outweigh its
benefits.
The privatization of the IRS mailroom casts light on issues
often left unexplored because understanding them seems too
complex and the connections among them and to us seem unclear. The story of how seventy-eight public employees lost
their jobs and its aftermath provides a lens through which to
understand the complexities of privatization and its impact on
us. The story of the IRS mailroom privatization reveals a very
expensive process that seems to have done no more than replace workers with disabilities with other workers with disabil157. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-142T, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY: RISK ASSESSMENT AND ENHANCED OVERSIGHT NEEDED
TO MANAGE RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS 11 (2007); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-990, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: IMPROVED
ASSESSMENT AND OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO MANAGE RISK OF CONTRACTING FOR
SELECTED SERVICES 3–4 (2007).
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ities and, in the process, replace low-wage jobs with benefits
and protections with jobs that are far worse.
Privatization was originally intended to promote quality
and lower cost by bringing the discipline of competition and
market pressure to bear.158 These forces are absent in the case
of a nonprofit organization such as ServiceSource. There was
no competition to get the work, and, as a nonprofit organization, ServiceSource is so highly subsidized that it has an unfair
advantage when competing with truly private companies. With
no market and no real competition, the forces that are supposed
to drive accountability and lead to better performance at less
cost are absent. As a result, in both the private and public sector, ServiceSource and similar contractors become not a driver
for better performance, but a force to drive down wages.
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that
nonprofit organizations such as ServiceSource are created in
response to real problems. Taking away ServiceSource’s public
subsidies would leave it not only unable to compete for these
jobs, but unable to operate programs intended to address the
problems facing people with disabilities.
Replacing the complex and expensive system we now have
that gives nonprofit organizations an incentive to become an
employer-contractor with a targeted system would also address
the perverse incentives nonprofit organizations now have not to
find mainstream work for their clients. In its 2005 report, the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
stated that “[t]here are no financial incentives to mainstream
persons with disabilities.”159 Clients of nonprofit organizations
such as ServiceSource are better served by being employed in
mainstream jobs, jobs such as those in the IRS mailrooms before privatization. While not the focus of this study, it seems
worth considering whether government subsidies aimed at
moving workers into mainstream jobs might play a positive
158. See Dannin, supra note 14, at 117–18.
159. REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYMENT
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR &
PENSIONS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR TOO FEW? OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 11 (2005), available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_10_20/O&I_pdf.pdf. It also found that
some nonprofit executives were exploiting JWOD contracts for personal financial gain. It found “numerous examples of excessive executive compensation,
lavish perquisites, conflicts of interest and self-dealing.” Id. The report concluded that JWOD and related programs have failed to achieve their stated
missions. See id. at 12–13.
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role, but not as they are now structured. Perhaps subsidies
would be more effective if they were targeted at encouraging
employers—public and private—to hire people with disabilities,
and directed towards the costs of providing workplace accommodations. Such targeted subsidies would keep employer labor
costs the same whether a worker had disabilities or not, and
would allow job candidates to compete on a level playing field.
Each of these issues—privatization, the role of nonprofit
organizations, and the need to support the integration of people
with disabilities into meaningful work—are complex and too
long ignored. It is necessary to take a hard but fair look at each
of them, amass meaningful data, and then assess how best we
should proceed.

